THE BIG IDEA: PRIZES TO STIMULATE R&D FOR NEW MEDICINES

JAMES LOVE & TIM HUBBARD*

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INTRODUCTION: THE CORE IDEA

The current system of financing research and development ("R&D") for new medicines is deeply flawed by the impact of high prices on access to medicine, the wasteful spending on marketing and R&D for medically unimportant products, and the lack of investment in areas of greatest public interest and need. It can and should be replaced with something better.

The system for financing new drug development can be radically improved—spending less overall, aligning investment incentives more efficiently—while making drugs available to everyone at cheap generic prices.

Reforming the way we pay for R&D on new medicines involves a simple but powerful idea. Rather than give drug developers the exclusive rights to sell products, the government would award innovators money: large monetary “prizes” tied to the actual impact of the invention on improvements in health care outcomes that successful products actually deliver.

I. BACKGROUND ON PRIZES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO MEDICAL R&D

The idea of using prizes to stimulate innovation has a long history, but in recent years, prize mechanisms have drawn new interest as a superior...
business model for the creation of medicines and some other knowledge goods.2

This has been motivated in part by developments in information technologies, particularly the Internet, where vast knowledge goods and services are available for free, on the margin. These examples, which have been directly experienced and highly valued by millions of persons, are leading to new examinations of how other knowledge goods, including inventions of new drugs and vaccines, could be more widely shared.

In 2002, Aventis, the giant pharmaceutical firm, held a three-day scenario planning session in Ottrott-le-Haut, France, to consider what might happen if there were radical changes in the business models for new drug development. The meeting was authorized by the Aventis CEO and the company’s board of directors, and included more than two dozen high-level Aventis executives and two critics of the existing regime of

incentives: Tim Hubbard, Head of Human Genome Research for the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute and a leading proponent of placing genome research in the public domain, and James Love, then as Director of the Consumer Project on Technology and a proponent of compulsory licensing of patents on medicines in developing countries.

One product of this meeting was initially dubbed “Radical IPR Scenario # 1.” It involved a proposal to eliminate marketing monopolies for new pharmaceutical drugs, in return for a system of large cash prizes. In order to ensure the entire world shared the costs of drug development, there would be a global treaty that set minimum levels of support for R&D, either through similar prizes funds or other research projects, including open source research similar to the Human Genome Project.

When the Aventis scenario exercise concluded, some thought it offered a superior and plausible alternative to the current systems of paying for R&D for new medicines and could be translated into a broader global campaign for access to medical inventions. The campaign would focus on issues of fairness and economic efficiency. The new system was justified on both moral and economic grounds.

II. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT “PRICE” INCENTIVE

It’s not easy to summarize the complicated economics of the pharmaceutical industry, but some basic facts are helpful to review. According to the market research firm IMS, global sales for pharmaceutical products were $602 billion in 2005, or 1.35 percent of global GDP. Some experts believe that the current system of market monopolies for drug sales increased 2006 drug prices by $400 to $480 billion. In the United States market, brand name products are on average twelve times more expensive than generics when purchased from manufacturers.


4. In 2005, the United States market share for generic pharmaceutical products was 56 percent by volume, but only 9 percent by sales. On average, generic manufacturers sold products at only 8 percent of the price of branded products. Generic Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.gphaonline.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). Prices to consumers, which reflect pharmacy mark-ups and other distribution costs, have somewhat different relative prices, but still reflect large differences between patented and generic prices. Price premiums for “brand name” trademarks for medicines are also higher largely because of the long period of exclusive marketing rights, which associates the name of the product with the trademark and presents entry barriers for generic products.
The hefty price premiums for patented brand name products are tolerated for one reason and one reason only: this is how we stimulate R&D for new medicines.

A simple but often overlooked question is how much R&D do we get for the price premium? The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (“IFPMA”) claims that global private sector investments in R&D were about $51 billion in 2005, or less than 9 percent of global sales. This is what we get for the $400 to $480 billion in higher prices. The patent system (as currently implemented) is a very expensive way to stimulate R&D. Consumers pay eight or nine dollars in higher prices to stimulate one dollar in R&D spending.

But what type of R&D does this buy? The granting of marketing monopolies creates big incentives to develop products that have modest (if any) medical benefits when compared to existing medicines. If marketed heavily, such products can fetch high prices, so long as they are perceived to be roughly as good as another high-priced medicine. In some cases, products are simple reformulations of existing drugs, with only minor benefits in drug delivery.

Among experts, it is well known that most new drugs are not very important, because they don’t offer significant improvements over existing medicines and come at the cost of unknown adverse reactions that will only emerge over time.

A recent study by the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”) found that of the 1,284 new drug approvals (“NDAs”) from 1990 to 2004, only 289, or 22.5%, were for “priority” reviews, defined as a product that presents a “significant improvement compared to marketed products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease.” Of the priority products, 183 (14.3 percent of the total NDAs) were classified by the FDA as new molecular entities (“NMEs”).


6. The United States trade association PhRMA often presents data that suggests higher rates of investment in R&D. They are often misleading, because they don’t take into account the fact that while most of the global R&D spending occurs in the United States, products are sold globally. PhRMA surveys systematically exclude R&D spending and sales by foreign subsidiaries of foreign pharmaceutical companies and do not include revenues for non-PhRMA members.

7. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6020.3 (2007). The FDA classification is prospective designation, and a post-approval evaluation may indicate proportions that are higher or lower.

8. Id.
Not only are most new drug approvals for products not very important medically, but the costs of drug development for the so called “me-too” products are often more expensive. The largest costs for the development of new drugs are for clinical trials involving humans. A recent study of clinical trials by Love and Patel found that the number of patients enrolled in clinical trials is almost twice as large for products that don’t have significant therapeutic benefits over existing drugs. This is not surprising. Once regulators like the United States FDA determine that products have few incremental benefits over existing medicines, they are likely to require more proof that the products don’t cause harm to patients. Companies also need larger trials to claim that small differences in efficacy are statistically significant.

The companies who sell the products also admit that they invest in clinical trials that have little scientific value, largely for marketing purposes. Eve Slater, as Merck’s Senior President for Clinical Testing, complained to the Wall Street Journal that post-marketing studies “are billowing out of control,” with “a total lack of science” in some studies. When rivals offer studies that can be used to influence doctors and patients “you have to do it, too, or you are dead in the water,” Slater said.9

One measure of the lack of scientific relevance of many of the clinical trials is found on the section of the FDA drug marketing label titled “clinical trials.” Weighted by the number of patients, the FDA cites less than half of the clinical trials that companies report having undertaken, as evidence to support the safety and efficacy of the products.10

This is the current system of stimulating R&D. In 2005, prices were $400 to $480 billion higher due to patent monopolies, in return for $51 billion in private sector R&D, and probably one-half to two-thirds of the R&D investments were directed towards projects of almost no medical significance.

What do these high prices do in terms of access? In a country with comprehensive healthcare insurance, where all new medicines are available through insurance, access would not suffer. Unfortunately, that does not describe the world we live in.

The situation is direst in developing countries, where access to medicines is often appalling. The World Health Organization’s “essential medicines list” (“EML”) is limited to products that are “cost-effective.”

The most recent version of the list included only fourteen patented products, eleven of which were for the treatment of AIDS, and only three for all other diseases.11 AIDS drugs were only added to the list after activists launched a campaign for compulsory licenses on patents for AIDS drugs, and lobbied wealthy governments to fund the cost of treatment.

Major pharmaceutical companies routinely offer products in developing countries at high prices, not because they are concerned about re-importation to wealthy countries, but because the actual profit-maximizing prices are often those that target the elites who control the most income. A 2004 study of the pricing of Merck’s asthma drug Singular found that it was only affordable for the wealthiest 10 percent of the South African population, the group that also controlled about half the country’s income. Merck would have to decrease the price significantly to make the product affordable to even the top 20 percent of the population, let alone most people, and in doing so would have lower profits, even with more units sold.

In a 2004 meeting at the World Bank, a Novartis executive said the company considered India a country of 50 million potential customers, including only the 5 percent of the population with incomes comparable to Europeans. These stories are repeated all over the world, as illustrated by well-known disputes, such as over the prices of the heart disease drug Plavix in the Dominican Republic and Thailand, Pfizer’s price of Norvasc in the Philippines, Pfizer’s fluconazole in Honduras, or Tamilfu for government stockpiles, to mention only a few examples.12

Developing countries like Brazil and Thailand, with large populations of AIDS patients, find their political will to provide treatment challenged by the high prices for new second-line AIDS drugs, which eat up healthcare budgets.

In developed economies the problems are less severe, but quite real. The United States reportedly has more than 50 million persons without health insurance, including many in the middle class, who face enormous


challenges when diagnosed with severe illnesses. Some United States employers who provide insurance find ways to avoid hiring workers who will likely need expensive drugs. Public and private insurance companies everywhere try to limit access to some expensive new medicines. Several governments have been in difficult negotiations over the high price of Gardasil, the new vaccine for the leading cause of cervical cancer. In many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries, reimbursements for very expensive drugs for cancer and other severe illnesses are restricted to limited uses, or in some cases are not available at all.

There are many other important issues concerning current mechanisms to simulate R&D. For example:

**Drug Resistance:** New antibiotics are needed to combat resistance to older drugs. But once they are developed, it is better if the drugs are only used when the older drugs fail, to reduce the risks of resistance to the new medicines. On the other hand, companies that hold the patents on such medicines have incentives to encourage product use in order to increase sales.

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Delivery Systems: In many areas, products will be more useful if delivery systems or storage characteristics are improved, or if medicines are used as co-formulated products or “cocktails,” such as ritonavir with other protease inhibitors. Often these opportunities are discouraged by restrictive licensing policies set by parties holding blocking patents.

Prescribing Practices: A system that focuses on market exclusivity also suffers from over-investment in wasteful marketing activities, and often from the irrational prescribing practices that such marketing efforts promote. Company designs of clinical trials often avoid the types of comparisons between drugs that would be most useful in designing rational prescribing practices.

Special health problems that disproportionately impact the poor: When marketing exclusivity is the reward, investors rationally target research investments to address the problems of patients who have the highest incomes and can pay the highest prices. The WHO’s Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (“CIPIH”) used a three-category classification of diseases. Type I diseases are those for which the burden is roughly the same everywhere, and there is a significant market in high-income countries. Examples of Type I diseases would include diabetes, heart disease, asthma, and most non-communicable diseases. Type II diseases are those for which there is some disease burden and market in high-income countries, but where most patients are low-income persons living in low-income countries. Examples of Type II diseases would include AIDS or tuberculosis. Type III diseases are those that almost entirely afflict poor people living in poor countries. Examples of Type III diseases would include malaria or Chagas’ disease. The CIPIH noted that under a system of incentives that targets prices (and incomes of patients), there is considerable under-investment in Type II and III diseases relative to need when measured on medical and social grounds, a problem that is widely discussed in the public health literature and the subject of reports by periodic reports by the Global Forum for Health Research.

17. This was taken from the earlier report of the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH).

Public health experts also note the special problems of treating patients in resource-poor settings, even for Type I diseases. For example, the lack of heat-stabilized insulin for diabetes is an enormous problem for patients living where reliable and convenient refrigeration is not available.

III. PRIZE SYSTEMS TO SIMULATE INVESTMENTS IN MEDICAL INNOVATION

Economists have long seen prizes as a possible alternative to systems of exclusive marketing rights. In recent years, work on prizes was an academic backwater, seen more as a novelty than an important policy option. It was more than a decade after Brian Wright’s widely read 1983 paper in the *American Economic Review* that academic economists begin to display much interest in prizes. But by the late 1990s, as the impact of the Internet and other new business models began to shake the technology sector, interest in new business models for knowledge goods began to grow.

Prizes are an appealing answer to a thorny dilemma. How can society ensure that knowledge goods, which are both costly to create and potentially “non-rival” in use, be shared freely? The patent system is a government intervention that makes a compromise. Inventors are given temporary legal monopolies. Goods are not shared for a period of time, and then they enter the public domain. The prize system is a way of rethinking the problem. If you can divorce the incentive for innovation from the product’s price to consumers, knowledge goods, including the R&D for a new medicine, can be placed in the public domain immediately.

But if prizes replace prices as the relevant incentive, who determines the amount of the prize? This has been the major drawback to the use of the prize system. In many areas of the economy, there is a reluctance to abandon a system of prices determined by actual market transactions as the method of determining the value of the knowledge good.

Many of the academic papers on prizes focused on this problem, devising a variety of mechanisms and rules for setting the value of prizes, often seeking to mimic the outcomes of market transactions. For example, Michael Kremer’s 1998 paper on patent buy-outs proposed a voluntary system for buying out patent rights by using auctions to determine values.20

Kremer soon began to focus on problems of R&D for medicines for
diseases that primarily concern the poor, like malaria. But rather than a
system of prizes or patent buy-outs, he called for large, government-funded
programs to buy products at high prices. Kremer’s proposals for “advanced
purchase commitments” or “advanced marketing commitments” were
designed to address the problem of the poor not being able to pay the high
prices for the drugs and to tie the purchases to plans for delivering the
products to patients. They were strictly voluntary and did not seek to place
inventions into the public domain. By maintaining the ability of drug
developers to obtain high prices for products and control the patent rights,
Kremer, Jeffrey Sachs, and others were able to gain the support of the
Gates Foundation and large pharmaceutical companies, groups that were
anxious to show that tough intellectual property rules were consistent with
development.

In May 2001 in Montreux, the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”) organized the first of two meetings
between industry, academics, and NGOs to discuss intellectual property
rights in biotechnology and healthcare. This meeting sparked interest in
new business models for drug development, including the use of prize
funds, as well as other approaches to supporting “open source” medicines.
The WBCSD effort led to the September 2002 Aventis scenario-planning
exercise in Ottrott-le-Haut, on “Pharma Scenarios for Sustainable
Healthcare,” referred to above, where Tim Hubbard and James Love
presented Radical IP Scenarios #1 and #2. At the heart of the proposals
were two ideas.

The trade framework should no longer focus on standardized rules of
minimum levels of intellectual property protection (such as the WTO
TRIPS agreement and various WTO accession commitments, and bilateral
and regional intellectual property trade agreements) or drug prices (such as
the 1993 U.S./Thailand, 1999 U.S./E.U./Korea, or 2005 U.S./Australia
agreements on pharmaceutical prices). Instead, the focus would be on
agreements between countries to support investments in R&D; providing a
more flexible system for addressing the “free rider” issue that would
recognize the value of different approaches, including both public and
private sector investments; and “open” and “closed” science projects. In the
2002 proposal for the development of medicines, this would be closely tied
to a country’s GDP.

The primary “pull” incentive for private investment would no longer
be the prospect of a marketing monopoly, but rather a system of prizes that
rewarded the impact of the inventions on healthcare inventions. There
would be a “separation” of the markets for the products and innovation. Innovations would enter the public domain, but innovators would profit when the inventions provided benefits to patients.

There was also work on proposals for new “competitive intermediaries” funded by mandatory employer/employee contributions to provide money for various open science projects. These intermediaries would be similar to venture capital funds, but would target investments in projects that yielded scientific rather than financial returns. Employers would be required to contribute, but would also be given the freedom to choose to which intermediaries they would give money. Proponents of this approach argue that employers would rationally target intermediaries that invested in the most promising advances in medical science, even when the investments were directed at basic or translational research, rather than final products.

Beginning in late 2002, the new paradigm proposals were presented at dozens of seminars and meetings, and were the subject of a Rockefeller-funded Bellagio series of meetings, as well as at three meetings at Columbia organized with Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz, and the main ideas were published in a number of papers.

The initial reaction to the Avantis scenarios was positive but somewhat skeptical within the public health community, and largely negative among major pharmaceutical companies. However, interest in the proposals began to grow when academic economists began to publish similar ideas; the major pharmaceutical companies began to mount attacks on the proposals; DiMasi and Grabowski, well known academic authors and industry advisors, co-authored a critique; and a United States government health official asked the WHO to not discuss the ideas.

In 2004, economist Aidan Hollis approached KEI (CPTech at that time) to explore ways to implement a system of prizes linked to health

21. Love & Hubbard, Paying, supra note 2, at 211–12.
23. Dean Baker was advocating a different approach that involved government-funded drug development companies, which he claimed was superior the prize fund approach. Baker, supra note 2.
24. Weisbrod, supra note 2.
25. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 2.
outcomes in a limited and voluntary fashion, focusing on R&D for neglected diseases. While recognizing the interest in exploring more limited applications of the prize fund approach, our preference was to focus attention on the possibility of a more radical change, targeting not only problems of so-called “Type II and III” diseases, but as a model for any disease and any country, including in particular the United States market, which is the most important in the world, and not as a voluntary system, but as a new incentive system that would replace government-imposed marketing monopolies.

In January 2005, Hollis and political scientist Thomas Pogge separately published papers that presented proposals for voluntary prize funds, and Congressman Bernard Sanders introduced an ambitious, non-voluntary prize fund system in the United States Congress based upon the Hubbard/Love/CPTech proposals.\(^{27}\)

On February 24, 2005, 162 leading scientists, academic law professors, economists, NGOs, members of parliaments, government officials and others wrote the WHO Executive Board and CIPIH to request that they evaluate a proposal for a New Global Medical R&D Treaty.\(^{28}\) The February 24, 2005, proposal was ambitious, offering a complete alternative to the exiting trade framework involving TRIPS and TRIPS-plus measures on intellectual property rights and drug prices. In addition to creating new global minimum requirements to support medical R&D, it created a system of identifying and rewarding investments in priority research, open research, technology transfer, and the preservation and dissemination of traditional medical knowledge.\(^{29}\)

With respect to new incentives based upon prizes, Hollis proposed rewards for inventions that treated neglected diseases, with the amount of the rewards determined by the supply of innovations that improved Quality Adjusted Life Years (“QALYs”) in a competition for a fixed prize fund, an approach similar to the one being proposed for a bill in the United States Congress by Representative Sanders.

Pogge proposed an international agreement that would be an open-ended commitment to reward QALYs at a fixed rate or dollar per QALY,


\(^{29}\) One novel and controversial aspect of the proposal was the creation of a system of tradable credits for investments in these projects, influenced in part by suggestions from Columbia economist Joshua Zivin, then with the Council of Economic Advisors.
an approach that we had rejected because of the difficulty of independently determining rates for QALYs and the uncertainty of budget outlays. Like Hollis, Pogge’s proposal was voluntary, and innovators could choose to protect inventions as monopolies rather than participate in the prize program. Unlike Hollis, Pogge’s proposal was not limited to particular diseases.

On January 26, 2005, Representative Bernard Sanders (now a Senator from Vermont) introduced H.R. 417 in the 109th Congress under the title of the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act. Sanders based his bill on the proposals championed by Hubbard and Love. H.R. 417 was the first practical illustration of how a prize fund would operate, and it was the most ambitious. It had a budget, initially set at 0.5 percent of the United States GDP, and a management structure. It addressed a number of practical issues. These are some highlights:

H.R. 417 does not do away with the patent system. Innovators can still get patents, and use patents to protect inventions, up until the point when a product is registered for sale. At that point, however, rewards for the invention from the prize fund replace the exclusive rights of patent as the incentive mechanism. In effect, it changes the way the patent system works and provides a new system of intellectual property incentives.

H.R. 417 was not a strict “QALY” proposal. A management structure would administer the prizes under a set of general rules, including consideration of the following:

- The number of patients who benefit from a drug, biological product, or manufacturing process including (in cases of global neglected diseases, global infectious diseases, and other global public health priorities) the number of non-United States patients.
- The incremental therapeutic benefit of a drug, biological product, or manufacturing process, compared to existing drugs, biological products, and manufacturing processes available to treat the same disease or condition.
- The degree to which the drug, biological product, or manufacturing process addresses priority health care needs, including
  - current and emerging global infectious diseases;
  - severe illnesses with small client populations (such as indications for which orphan designation has been granted under section 526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act30); and

neglected diseases that primarily afflict the poor in developing countries.

- Improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for drugs or biological processes.

Companies who registered new medicines with the United States FDA would compete for rewards by providing evidence that inventions benefit patients, as measured by improved health outcomes.

The rewards would be paid annually, over a ten-year period of time (because information about the safety and efficacy of new medicines emerges over time).

In cases where a new invention is based upon an earlier invention, H.R. 417 allows for sharing of rewards, so that a follow-on invention may completely replace an existing medicine, but the earlier product could still receive prize money, even with a zero market share, if the second product was based upon its technology. The aim is to give the correct incentives for products that are both first- and second-movers, since both are important.

In the next version, the prize fund will seek to address the issue of products that are registered at nearly the same time, an issue raised by Dean Baker in discussions on the bill.

The amount of the reward for a particular drug would be determined by supply and demand. The size of the prize fund constitutes the “demand” for innovations. Companies (or non-profit developers) would enter the market to supply such innovations so long as the expected returns (the expected share of the prize fund rewards) are greater than the expected R&D costs.

The size of the prize fund is important, and the basic structure of H.R. 417 accommodates changes in views concerning the needed magnitude of incentives. If the government wants to stimulate more private investment in R&D, it can increase the size of the prize fund administratively, for example, from 50 basis points to 70 or 100 basis points of GDP. The amount of private investment in R&D thus becomes a matter of public policy. The size of the prize fund can be increased or decreased, and it has nothing to do with the price of the products themselves.

The policy-making board has the authority to determine many of the details of the prize-fund reward system later, within certain parameters. As noted, rewards would be based upon evidence that inventions provide “incremental” benefits. No “single drug, biological product, or manufacturing process” could receive more than five percent of the total rewards in any given year. There were also certain “set-asides” for special
public health problems or needs. These included the following initial minimum allocations:

- 4 percent for global neglected diseases;
- 10 percent for orphan drugs; and
- 4 percent for global infectious diseases and other global public health priorities, including research on AIDS, AIDS vaccines, and medicines for responding to bio-terrorism.

The break in the link between the price of the product and the reward to the drug developer has many benefits, including the following:

- Patients who need drugs and third parties that pay for medicines through insurance would no longer restrict access to medicines because of high prices. Formularies for medicines would no longer be based upon drug prices, but rather the medical qualities of the medicines.
- Like in India for more than thirty years, drug manufactures would be able to sell any product. They would no longer have incentives to manufacture and sell inferior medicines.
- By removing legal monopolies, companies that are efficient and have a good reputation for quality would have an edge.
- Incentives for marketing would be radically changed. Marketing of a product like Vioxx to patients who did not need the drug, as was done by Merck, would not be profitable, because the prizes would only reward incremental health care benefits. Marketing could also not move the price for the product itself because of competition among generic suppliers. Only evidence of benefits would generate rewards, making it less profitable to market medicines as if they are fashion accessories or magic potions.

IV. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF PRIZE FUNDS

There are a number of important issues in the design of a prize fund. Many of these are usefully discussed in Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele’s influential 1998 and 2001 papers on prizes, as well as in the growing literature of economists and law professors on prizes.

32. Lee Davis, Intellectual Property Rights, Strategy and Policy, 13 Econ. Innovation & New Tech. 399 (2004); Lee Davis & Jerome Davis, How Effective Are Prizes as Incentives to Innovation? Evidence from Three 20th Century Contests, Paper for the Druid Summer Conference on Industrial Dynamics, Innovation and Development, Elsinore, Denmark (2004); Abramowicz, supra note 1; Romer, supra note 1; Davis, supra note 1; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 1; Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of
A. Voluntary or Non-voluntary?

Love and Hubbard have argued for a non-voluntary replacement of prizes for marketing monopolies, but have also considered the possibility of voluntary mechanisms in the recent deliberations in the WHO’s Intergovernmental Working Group (“IGWG”) on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health.\(^3\)

Hollis and Pogge have proposed voluntary prize mechanisms largely because they believe such mechanisms would be politically appealing to the existing pharmaceutical industry, which could choose between monopoly profits and the prize reward system.\(^3\) Some have even proposed that prizes be a supplement rather than replacement for marketing monopolies.

The differences between the voluntary and non-voluntary systems are most significant in cases where existing markets are large, such as for type I diseases, in OECD countries. For Type III and some Type II diseases, or for innovations that adapt medicines for resource-poor settings, a strong prize system might be the only significant reward for innovators in developing countries.

Voluntary prize mechanisms would also be the most expensive, since companies could opt for the larger sum between monopoly profits or the prizes, or in some proposals, for both. In such situations the result would either be high prices or larger prizes to encourage the adoption of prizes rather than monopoly profits. Voluntary mechanisms also do not address many well-known pricing abuses and access problems if the patent owner chooses the monopoly over the prize. For these reasons, the non-voluntary option will provide greater benefits and likely generate more support from the persons who actually pay for medicines (consumers, employers, insurers, governments).

B. Relationship to the Patent System

The prize system is often presented to the public as an alternative to the patent system, but it need not be. In many of the proposals for voluntary prize mechanisms, patent owners effectively choose whether or not to license patents for the uses tied to the prize payments. In some proposals,
prizes would simply supplement the benefits of strong patent protection and not replace the patent monopoly.\textsuperscript{35} Other proposals would have prizes coexist with a weaker patent system. An example of the later is H.R. 417 from the 109th Congress, a legislative proposal by Bernard Sanders to create a Medical Innovation Prize Fund in the United States. H.R. 417 did not eliminate patents on medicines, but once the FDA approves products, the patent would no longer prevent generic competition for the patented invention. Inventors would effectively use patents to make claims on the prize fund, rather than to create monopolies for products. But H.R. 417 did not limit the prize fund payments to only patented inventions. Any new product would qualify, including one that was developed without patents, such as paclitaxel, the unpatented cancer drug developed by the National Institutes of Health.

C. Fixed Total Prize Fund Obligations, or Obligation to Pay Fixed Prize Per QALY?

Hubbard and Love, as well as Hollis, proposed fixed prize funds with payments divided among innovators on the basis of the relative merits of each innovation. Pogge proposed a fixed payment per QALY, with an open-ended obligation to pay for prizes.

There are three major reasons why we support the fixed total prize fund approach: First, it provides greater ability to control and predict government budget outlays. This is a major issue for the governments that will have to pay the prizes. Second, by fixing the size of the prize fund, the marginal cost of using an innovation is zero, since it does not change the annual budget for the prize payments. This is essential for the elimination of price-sensitive medical formularies. Third, by fixing the size of the prize fund, the developers of products will have an incentive to lobby for fair and efficient methods of valuing inventions. If too much money is given to one inventor, prizes available for everyone else are smaller.

D. Structure of Prizes (and Relationship to QALYs)

Hollis and Pogge propose a strictly proportional link to QALYs as the standard for measuring benefits and allocating prize fund awards. The flaw of this is that it over-rewards products with very large QALYs at the expense of other valuable products with much lower QALYs. We believe

\textsuperscript{35} This is a possibility that seems to be suggested by Stiglitz in his BMJ article. See Stiglitz, \textit{Scrooge}, supra note 2.
rewards should partly but not exclusively be linked to QALYs to ensure the
development of a broader range of products and to address other R&D
objectives.

First, how would a strictly proportional QALY payout work? In the
Hollis formulation, if three drug developers were responsible for 1,000;
2,000; and 7,000 QALYS, the total number of QALYS would be 10,000
and the shares of the fund would be divided as follows: 1,000/10,000 = 0.1;
2,000/10,000 = 0.2; and 7,000/10,000 = 0.7.

We prefer a system where the administrators of a prize fund have the
flexibility to consider different approaches, rather than only one that is
strictly proportional to QALYs. 36

Larger QALYs are associated with both the efficacy of the products
and the number of patients who use them. Diseases like breast cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, and asthma have very large patient populations. Some
diseases or conditions have very few patients. In the current market,
governments and private insurers are willing to pay higher prices for
products that have relatively small client populations, such as the high
prices paid for Gleevec (STI571) or Ceredase (Alglucerase), medicines
used to treat diseases classified as “orphans” by the United States FDA.

The arguments for paying higher prices for products with smaller
client populations are several, including the fact that the costs of drug
development are normally not strongly tied to the size of the potential
market. There are also benefits in having new medicines on the market
because they may later be used for new indications, as has been the case for
medicines such as AZT (originally developed for cancer, now used for
AIDS), Viagra (originally developed for heart disease, now used to
enhance erections), or ritonavir (originally developed as a standalone
protease inhibitor, now used as a booster of protease inhibitors).

It is possible to simulate prize fund payments and development costs
to better understand the consequences of different reward designs. For a
simple example, consider a world where the risk-adjusted cost of drug

36. The approaches used can also be transparent and predictable, although the issue of
predictability has to be placed into perspective. In a world with strong exclusive rights and prices
completely unfettered by government regulation, patent owners still face considerable uncertainty,
given the well-known risks that unanticipated adverse effects or the emergence of superior alternatives
will reduce demand for products. And methodologies for government reimbursement programs that
involve impendent evaluation of the value of medicines are also constantly being changed in response
to lobbying by right-owners and new thinking by academic researchers and policy makers. Add to this,
the stochastic nature of the R&D process itself. These risks are not by themselves problematic, if capital
markets are efficient, and if investors believe that the overall level of funding will be large rather than
small.
development is fixed at $200 million, the size of the prize fund is $2 billion, and there are five potential candidates for R&D, expecting to yield 1,000; 2,000; 3,000; 7,000 and 25,000 QALYs. If the prizes were allocated with a strictly proportional payout per share of QALYs, as proposed by Hollis and Pogge, only two the projects would be brought to market. If the prize fund were allocated half on the basis of QALYs and half for bringing a new product for market, all five projects would be brought to market.

Table 1
Two prize payments methods compared
2,000 prize fund, 200 fixed R&D cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>QALYs (000)</th>
<th>Rewards Proportional to QALYs</th>
<th>Half allocated proportional to QALYs, half for successful new drugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rewards Proportional to QALYs</td>
<td>Project Payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above is just a simple illustration of a prize fund structure that levels out the rewards somewhat, giving relatively larger prizes to the projects associated with fewer QALYs and less to projects with more QALYs, which could ensure that more projects are undertaken. In the real world, it is much more complicated to model. Risk-adjusted costs are themselves a function of the expected payoffs (companies will take larger gambles or spend more on known risks if the expected payoffs are higher), for example, but the basic point is quite important. The fact that we currently accept much higher prices for products with smaller client populations provides some evidence that the market itself seeks to accommodate the issue of high fixed-development costs.

37. For a different view, see Posting of Aidan Hollis to Drug Development, http://www.cptech.org/blogs/drugdevelopment/atom.xml (July 08, 2006).
More sophisticated modeling is possible for the relationship to R&D costs and QALYs and also for consideration of other approaches, such as option pricing models, to address the valuation of new antibiotics or products developed for potential health threats, such as medicines and vaccines for avian flu, SARS, or bio-terrorism.

Some issues of prize-fund design can also be addressed through instruments like caps on shares given to any one product, or set-asides for special categories of medicines, approaches already incorporated in H.R. 417.

E. Timing of Payoff

It is very difficult to know what the benefits of a product will be when it is first placed on the market. We recommend prizes be paid out over time, as more is known about utilization, safety, and efficacy of products. The Sanders bill uses a ten-year period for evaluation, with payments made annually, given the evidence available for that year, a system that approximates the existing effective term of marketing monopolies. A longer period could be used, but periods too long may not be desirable, given the high discount rates for the private investors.

Under the current system of incentives linked to marketing monopolies, governments issue twenty-year patents on products, processes or uses of products; exclusive rights in pharmaceutical test data, orphan product exclusive marketing protections; various sui generis programs to extend patent terms; and other legal barriers to entry. Table 2 looks at the current (February 2007) status of new molecular entities that were approved for marketing by the United States FDA from 1990 to 2005.

Table 2
Status of competition: NMEs approved by FDA from 1990 to 2005
Orange Book Status as of February 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of FDA approval</th>
<th>Monopoly seller</th>
<th>Facing competition</th>
<th>Facing competition or withdrawn</th>
<th>Year on the market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. Size of the Prize Fund

The 2005 Sanders proposal would create a prize fund of 50 basis points of United States GDP. Love’s 2005 WHO publication on remuneration for non-voluntary use of patents simulated a lower rate for countries, starting with a top rate of 20 basis points for high-income countries, and reducing that rate according to rankings on the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) human development index.39 Pogge’s 2005 papers recommended a global prize fund of approximately 10 basis points of world GDP.

The size of a prize fund should be related to its objectives and seen in the broader context of other efforts to fund R&D. If the prize fund were the only source of R&D funding, it would have to be very large. If prizes coexist with other instruments to finance R&D, such as patent monopolies,

public sector R&D funding, employer contributions to research funds, UNITAID-type global transactions taxes, or other sources, then the prize fund might be smaller. Holding all other R&D funding options constant, the larger the prize fund, the more investment it will stimulate.

In looking at the appropriate size of a prize fund, there are several factual and policy issues that should be considered, including the current levels and composition of investment in R&D for new medicines by the public and private sector, the anticipated risk and profit premiums (discount rates) for attracting private investment, and the opportunities for the public sector to strategically subsidize some aspects of drug development costs, such as for clinical trials. Governments will also be making implicit or explicit assumptions about the elasticity of supply of improved health care outcomes. To the degree that greater investments in R&D for new medicines have high yields in terms of improved outcomes, they are economically efficient and attractive uses of scarce resources.

G. Valuation of Inventions

The government of Australia, a country with a population just over twenty million persons, evaluates the “value” of medicines in order to set reimbursements for its Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (“PBS”). Other governments do things that are quite similar. In the U.K., evaluation of benefits is by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (“NICE”). In Australia, the U.K., Canada, New Zealand, and in many OECD countries, governments are making decisions on the allowed reimbursement rates for new medicines. The United States Congress is asking the United States federal government to do the same. Private insurance companies also have to decide if or how much they will reimburse medicines. Explicitly or implicitly, these evaluations are based upon evidence of the pharmoeconomic benefits of the products.

Logically, there is very little difference between determining the value of a reimbursement and determining the value of a prize. If one can be done, so can the other.

The basic tools for valuation are already at hand, filling volumes of specialized journals, but there is room for considerable improvement, particularly in terms of the evidence now collected from clinical trials.

40. Love & Hubbard, Paying, supra note 2, at 219–23.
H. Allocation of Set-Asides for Priority or Neglected Areas

As described above, the Sanders bill recognizes that policymakers want to address certain health problems, and that this extends to the systems of stimulating R&D on new medicines. For example, in the United States and Europe, special marketing exclusivity provisions are provided for products with small markets (sometimes referred to as “orphan” products following the United States’ passage of the “Orphan Drug Act” in 1982). The Sanders bill created initial set-asides for three categories of priority research:

- 4 percent for global neglected diseases;
- 10 percent for orphan drugs; and
- 4 percent for global infectious diseases and other global public health priorities, including research on AIDS, AIDS vaccines, and medicines for responding to bio-terrorism.

The bill allows the set-aside percentages to be modified by the board that administers the prize fund.

I. Treatment of Follow-on Innovation

One of the most important aspects of any incentive mechanism for new medicines concerns the treatment of follow-on inventions. The most risky investments and the most difficult science are often for the first product in a therapeutic class. It is often not difficult to engineer around the first product and introduce additional molecules that use similar mechanisms for treatments. Moreover, the later products are often better than the first in terms of efficacy or safety. Even when the differences are small, for example, between Zocor and Lipitor, it may be rational to switch patients to the newer product. This can radically reduce the market share of the product that established the value of the approach. An incentive system needs to provide incentives to both early movers and the follow-on inventions that improve upon the early entrant. H.R. 417 addresses this issue as follows:

In cases where a new drug, biological product, or manufacturing process offers an improvement over an existing drug, biological product, or manufacturing process and the new drug, biological product, or manufacturing process competes with or replaces the existing drug, biological product, or manufacturing process, the Board shall continue to make prize payments for the existing drug, biological product, or manufacturing process to the degree that the new drug, biological product, or manufacturing process was based on or benefited from the
development of the existing drug, biological product, or manufacturing process.\textsuperscript{41}

In short, under H.R. 417 the prize payments for the new product will reflect the incremental value of the improvements and the early entrant will continue to receive prize payments even if its market share falls to zero.

\textit{J. Transition from Current to New System}

The 2005 Sanders bill proposed an immediate transition to the new system. In the first year, 90 percent of the prize payments would be given to products already on the market. The share allocated to the older products would be reduced by 9 percent each year.

\textbf{V. SOLVING THE GLOBAL FREE-RIDER ISSUE}

The current global system for stimulating medical R&D relies extensively on a complex and growing web of global trade agreements to ensure minimum levels of intellectual property protection and, in some cases, minimum prices for medicines. These include the WTO TRIPS accord and the many bilateral and regional trade agreements that contain provisions on intellectual property of drug pricing.\textsuperscript{42}

Global agreements that seek only to enhance the exclusive marketing rights for medicines are highly imperfect instruments to address concerns about the equitable distribution of the costs of medical R&D. These obligations are focused not on R&D itself, but on the intermediate measures that will influence drug prices. In practice, countries with very similar systems of intellectual property protection often pay very different amounts for medicine. In most countries, reimbursements for medicines are tied to drug prices. Despite fairly similar intellectual property regimes, one observes very different outcomes in terms of actual outlays among developed economies, such as the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, Korea, and New Zealand. The same is true for developing economies, where the different cultures, traditions, and levels of states’ support for reimbursing purchases of medicines lead to quite different outcomes in countries like Kenya, India, South Africa, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and Thailand.


\textsuperscript{42} Such as the 1999 U.S./Korea and E.C./Korea agreements, and the more recent efforts by the E.C. to set minimum reimbursements in Turkey, or the United States efforts to undermine price negotiations or increase reimbursements in Australia, Malaysia, Canada, Germany, Thailand, and elsewhere.
To the extent that the current global framework does increase global outlays in patented medicines, it is quite inefficient, raising global outlays from $400 to $500 billion in 2005, for only $51 billion in private sector outlays on R&D, little of which was invested in products that were medically important. High drug prices have created a pervasive and harmful culture of rationing medicines, as evidenced by the paucity of patented medicines on the WHO essential drugs list, and the extensive efforts by governments and private insurance companies to justify limiting reimbursements for new medicines.

The current global framework also completely ignores global obligations to support investments in basic research, public goods like the Human Genome Project, investments in emerging public health threats, high risk translational research, diseases that primarily afflict poor people living in poor countries, or the types of clinical trials that would best evaluate the benefits and risks of existing medicines.

A shift from prices to prizes would require a new global framework to address the legitimate problems of sharing the costs of research and development for new products. The proposal to the WHO in February 2005 was one effort to address this issue. It presented a global framework that recognized the importance of both public and private sector investments in R&D, and it offered a framework for obligations and incentives to invest in projects and areas of public interest. The new global framework focuses on R&D directly, rather than the flawed mechanisms of high drug prices. It is entirely consistent with a shift from prices to prizes as the primary “pull” mechanism to stimulate medical R&D.

VI. COMPARISON OF THE PRIZE FUND APPROACH TO ADVANCED PURCHASE COMMITMENTS OR ADVANCED MARKETING COMMITMENTS

While prize mechanisms are beginning to attract more attention, in some circles a related but somewhat different approach is better known. Largely because of the effective advocacy of Michael Kremer and Jeffrey Sachs, and the support from Bill Gates and large pharmaceutical companies, there has been considerable work to explore the possible role of “advanced purchase commitments” (“APCs”) or “advanced marketing commitments” (“AMCs”). First proposed by Kremer and Sachs as mechanisms for stimulating “greenfield” R&D on new vaccines for malaria and other illnesses of the poor, APCs and AMCs are now largely discussed in the context of “late stage” R&D on products that are already far into the pipeline.
The APC and AMC approaches both embrace the notion that prices should continue to be the main signal for investors, even when patients are poor. The approaches do not change the nature of price-sensitive formularies. They do not move toward a world where the prices of innovation are zero on the margin. They do make a political statement: the price system works well when you have enough money to pay for it.

The most appealing argument in favor of the APC/AMC approach is that it links the R&D incentive to the delivery of the products to patients. However, there is no reason why a prize would not do the same thing, so long as prizes reward actual outcomes. In important ways, prizes would create more sustainable systems of finance. In the APC/AMC approach, governments or donors would spend large sums of money, billions of dollars in many proposals, to buy products at high prices and then deliver them to the poor. The developer of the products has no obligation to transfer the invention to the public domain and, indeed, no incentive to develop products that are particularly inexpensive to manufacture. When the APC/AMC payments stop, or even before they begin, the developer can charge whatever it wants, assisted by the fact that the governments or donors have deliberately established a high price.

The APC/AMC approach requires a specification of the products eligible for purchases. In some versions, the prices are determined before the products are fully developed. This feature of the APC/AMC approach creates considerable problems, as governments and donors are expected to anticipate technologies best suited to the health care objectives and the prices that will stimulate development of such technologies. This introduces the need for considerable information and judgment, as well as presents the possibility that the APC/AMC approach will be tailored for specific companies, just as a job description can be designed for a single applicant.

For many of these reasons, advocates of the APC/AMC approach have moved away from assertions that the mechanism should use “greenfield” R&D ventures, and now propose that the focus be placed on “late stage” R&D projects. How “late” would that be? If products are indeed “fully cooked” and ready for commercialization, the APC/AMC becomes simply a negotiation over a price in a procurement. If the APC/AMC approach is too early, it risks the inefficiencies associated with similar central planning exercises. The prize fund approach would suffer from these same problems if it is too closely tied to a special technological standard, and to a lesser but important extent, if tied to a narrow disease category.
Hubbard/Love, Hollis, Pogge, Sanders, Weisbrod, and some others have advocated an approach that is not tied to technology standards, but rather to improved health outcomes themselves, leaving the question of the technology to the developer. We all have proposed systems that are quite broad in terms of disease coverage. In our view, the objectives of the APC/AMC approach would be better served by a system of prizes. A system of prizes would create or enhance the incentives for R&D that lead to better health outcomes, with the benefit of providing incentives to create products for which the costs of manufacturing and delivery are minimized. Also, if the prizes are implemented within a fixed budget (as is advocated by Hubbard/Love, Hollis, and Sanders), it would ensure that products would benefit from marginal cost pricing.

VII. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION’S INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

In May 2006, the World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA 59.24, which created a new Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (referred to by the WHO internally as PHI/IGWG). This resolution combined two resolutions, one that concerned the recently completed report of CIPIH, and another concerning a “Global Framework on Essential Health Research and Development” that had been first sponsored by Kenya on November 16, 2005, and later co-sponsored by Brazil.

Under WHA 59.24, the WHA decided to establish, in accordance with Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the World Health Assembly, an intergovernmental working group open to all interested Member States to draw up a global strategy and plan of action in order to provide a medium-term framework based on the recommendations of the Commission. Such a strategy and plan of action aims at, inter alia, securing an enhanced and sustainable basis for needs-driven, essential health research and development relevant to diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries, proposing clear objectives and priorities for research and development, and estimating funding needs in this area.

The first meeting of the PHI/IGWG took place in December 2006. In February 2006, Bangladesh and Bolivia submitted papers to the PHI/IGWG calling for consideration of new methods of stimulating investments in

medical R&D, including the use of prizes. The Bangladesh submission said,

We note with great interest a shift in the global policy discussion, away from the status quo of TRIPS compliant patent regimes for medicines and toward new models for rewarding innovation, such as prize funds. The prize fund model separates the incentives for innovation from the prices of medicines. Innovation would be rewarded directly from nationally, regionally or globally managed prize funds based on improvements in health care outcomes, while ensuring low prices for medical innovations from generic competition immediately upon market entry.

The Bolivian submission echoed these themes, calling for the de-linking of R&D incentives from the prices of products, and called for the PHI/IGWG to evaluate the plausibility of creating a new system of prizes to reward development of essential medicines that improve health care outcomes:

Desvincular precios de los incentivos a la investigación y desarrollo (I+D)

Un numero creciente de economistas, expertos en salud, y empresas del sector privado están examinando los beneficios de cambiar la naturaleza de los incentivos privados para la investigación y desarrollo, para que no se vinculen a los precios de los medicamentos. Destacamos en particular el trabajo sobre premios (recompensas) de Tim Hubbard, James Love, Aidan Hollis, Thomas Pogge, y Joseph Stiglitz.

Sugerimos al IGWG evaluar la factibilidad de la creación de un sistema nuevo de premios para recompensar el desarrollo de medicamentos esenciales. Estos premios podrían recompensar las invenciones que mejoren las resultas.

The PHI/IGWG is focusing on new approaches to R&D for Type II and III diseases. The position of the large pharmaceutical industry has recently become more receptive to the consideration of prizes in this area. For example, in a January 11-12 meeting in New York on “Overcoming the gaps in TB drug development,” organized by MSF, the meeting participants adopted this statement on support for new approaches to R&D.

The TB community must engage in the World Health Organization’s Intergovernmental Working Group on Innovation, Intellectual Property and Public Health to establish a global R&D framework to help design


new ways of setting R&D priorities and financing. With respect to TB drug development, participants of the New York symposium support current discussion at the WHO for a treaty on essential health R&D that addresses the question of who pays for essential medical R&D and de-links incentives from drug prices, instead rewarding the impact of inventions according to health care outcomes.46

The New York statement on R&D was supported by the industry participants in the event. A representative from Novartis attending the event said that the current incentive systems do not work for diseases like TB, and that they were willing to look at alternatives, a view later shared by a representative from the IFPMA in a Geneva event on intellectual property rights and access to medicine, and echoed privately by a number of industry officials. These industry officials are unwilling, however, to endorse the prize model as the primary mechanism to support R&D for Type I diseases.

VIII. PRIZES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRICE DISCRIMINATION FOR PRODUCTS

Some critics of prizes have suggested that forms of price discrimination are a preferred method to promote access, because they are less disruptive of the current paradigms. However, price discrimination approaches can be difficult to implement in practice, often yield unsatisfactory results, and present conflicts with other policy objectives, such as the free movement of goods.

Price discrimination in medicines and vaccines is already persuasive. United States consumers generally pay more for patented pharmaceutical products than do consumers in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or Europe. Consumers in the Philippines generally pay higher prices for medicines than do consumers in Thailand. Prices in northern European countries historically have been higher than prices in southern European countries. Prices are quite different from country to country, and also within countries. Some of the price differences have nothing to do with the ability to pay.47 For example, uninsured patients in the United States lack the ability to bargain, and often pay higher prices than do patients that have insurance, despite their lesser ability to pay. Because of inefficient

47. See, for example, the many examples in Gelders et al., supra note 12.
distribution systems, consumers in Indonesia pay higher prices for generic antibiotics than do consumers in Canada.

In other cases, price discrimination is a rough but imperfect effort to extract higher prices from different classes of consumers. An example of this would be the two tiers of pricing of medicines between the public and private sector in some countries. But price discrimination is plagued with problems. It is difficult to monitor the ability of different groups to pay for medicines, and often companies simply target the highest price consumers. In developing countries, it is often the case that products are priced to sell to only the wealthiest 5 to 20 percent of consumers. The putative rationale for such policies is that it is costly if not impossible to prevent the rich from buying lower priced products that are affordable for the poor. The same argument is made with regard to pricing of products between rich and poor countries. Even information about price differences can lead to indirect price controls, through reference price mechanisms, for example, not to mention the theoretical possibility of parallel trade between countries.

One area where price discrimination is being severely challenged is in the European Union. Today there are twenty-seven member states in the European Union. Incomes between states are quite different. The average per capita income for these countries was $26,460 in 2004. Ten member states with a population of more than one hundred million persons have average incomes that are less than half of this. The European Union is now struggling with a dilemma. The policy of a unified market is creating huge problems for access to medicines within Europe.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Member State</th>
<th>Population in millions</th>
<th>GDP/POP $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>3,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>6,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>13,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>18,486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A switch from prices to prizes would allow the members of the European Union to reconcile the need for incentives for new drug development with access to medicine and the EU policy of a single market for the products. Prizes would be a particularly appropriate paradigm for Europe, where governments and employers already are providing extensive social insurance for pharmaceutical products, prices are already often determined by negotiations, and the free movement of goods is a core value. A system of prizes for Europe would also help address the troubling movement toward rationing for new medicines, particularly for the most expensive new medicines for severe illnesses.

This is also true in the larger global market, where the problems of limiting parallel trade and other diversions of medicines are making it more difficult to consider price discrimination as a viable strategy to protect consumers and promote access.

IX. INCREMENTAL OR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM?

There are two assumptions implicit in proposals that consider prize mechanisms only as special and limited programs to deal with areas of complete market failure, such as neglected diseases or sales to populations with almost no ability to pay. One is that the current system is functioning reasonably well, and it would not be prudent to change without more evidence that the alternative would work. The second is that it is politically difficult, if not impossible, to introduce a radical change in the way that R&D is financed for Type I diseases or for high-income markets, given the political power of the incumbent pharmaceutical companies. While we
support even limited efforts to experiment with the use of prizes to stimulate medical R&D, including those being considered today by the WHO’s IGWG on Public Health, Intellectual Property and Innovation, we have considered and rejected both assumptions against a broader and more radical reform.

Tying the incentive for R&D to the price of products fundamentally flaws the current system of financing R&D for new medicines. It has led to appalling disparities of access to medicines, well-known pricing abuses in both high- and low-income countries, massive waste in terms of excessive marketing of products and investments in medically unimportant products, and under-investment in products that have the greatest medical benefits. Prices for new medicines treating severe illnesses are very aggressive, which leads to increasing rationing of access, even in high-income countries. The existence of high prices in the United States and other high-income countries is leading to enormous pressures on other countries to accept high prices, through such measures as new intellectual property norms, exercised both formally and informally.

The intellectual property norms incorporated into the 1995 WTO TRIPS agreement were at the time considered to be quite tough. WTO members were obligated to provide twenty-year patents on pharmaceutical products and to abide by a set of rules when using compulsory licensing or other exceptions to patent rights. However, subsequent analysis and debate over the TRIPS agreement has shown that TRIPS itself can be a fairly flexible instrument if WTO members are willing to use the various exceptions and limitations to rights that are allowed in the agreement. These flexibilities include the ability to grant non-remunerative exceptions to patent rights in certain cases, to embrace relatively high standards for patentability, and to grant non-voluntary authorizations to use patents, subject to “adequate” remuneration.

Even before the TRIPS agreement came into force, the United States and other high-income countries sought a number of new bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements on intellectual property rights and drug pricing that go far beyond the 1995 TRIPS obligations. The Clinton Administration continued an aggressive “TRIPS plus” trade policy that was not modified until AIDS activists aggressively disrupted the presidential campaign of Al Gore in 1999. 48 The United States’ trade policy was then somewhat

moderated, with formal changes announced by President Clinton on December 1, 1999, followed by an executive order on AIDS and sub-Saharan Africa in May 2000. But as important as the changes in policy were, they were fairly limited and in practice did not extend greatly beyond policies relating to a single disease, AIDS, and were limited when applied even to AIDS outside of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, President Clinton’s trade team negotiated a 1999 agreement with Korea setting mandatory minimum price reimbursements for innovative medicines (the A-7 pricing agreement), and a 2000 FTA agreement with Jordan that dramatically narrowed the grounds under which Jordan could issue compulsory licenses on patents, as well as the protection of pharmaceutical test data and other provisions.

The 2000 United States Trade Representative 301 Report to Congress was the first to abide by the new program to address public health concerns. While it had been moderated, it still contained a number of citations for inadequate intellectual property protection of medicines, including complaints about failures to adopt intellectual property protections of pharmaceutical test data that go beyond WTO TRIPS obligations for Argentina, Chile, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Uruguay. On January 9, 2001, days before leaving office, President Clinton asked the WTO to bring trade sanctions against Brazil for a compulsory licensing statute, at a time when Brazil was considering issuing a compulsory license for the patents on the AIDS drug efavirenz (“EFV”).

President Bush took office initially sympathetic to some measures to balance trade policies on intellectual property protection, notably by deciding to keep the Clinton Executive Order on AIDS and Africa, and by participating constructively in the 2001 WTO negotiations that led to the widely praised Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. But by 2002, extensive lobbying and vast campaign contributions by the pharmaceutical industry led to changes in trade policy and were followed by the launching of a plethora of new bilateral and regional trade negotiations that sought tough TRIPS-plus measures, as well as new trade

agreements on drug pricing. The European Union and other high-income countries also pursued similar agreements.

Perhaps much more important than the formal agreements are the arm-twisting and pressuring of countries to prevent them from using the flexibilities existing in both the TRIPS and the new TRIPS-plus trade measures. In addition to the enormous power of the various threats and efforts to link pharmaceutical policies to broader trade and foreign policy considerations, countries north and south, faced considerable in-country lobbying by pharmaceutical companies and consistently inaccurate, biased, and pro-industry press coverage and academic commentary, which created effective soft norms against the use of TRIPS flexibilities or effective price controls. Even aggressive price negotiations are branded as “piracy” and theft of intellectual property. The most recent example of this dynamic is the bitter debate over the recent decision by Thailand to issue compulsory licenses on medicines for AIDS and heart disease.

Without a more fundamental reform in developed economies, it is unlikely that poor people in developing countries will be allowed to use the existing flexibilities in trade agreements. In this sense, the more radical reforms may be needed for a sustainable solution to the global problem of access.

CONCLUSION

In this article we have argued that it is possible to construct a viable new system to finance innovation in a way that maximizes access to new inventions while continuing to exploit commercial competitive market incentive mechanisms.

The prize mechanisms should be thought of as part of a larger ecosystem of financing medical R&D and should be implemented in combination with other instruments, such as direct or indirect government funding of basic research, non-profit product development partnerships (PDPs), clinical trials, and other traditional and non-traditional types of funding R&D. What the prizes offer uniquely is an alternative to the marketing monopoly as an incentive for private investment.

When implemented properly, prize based models can directly reward successful R&D projects, while permitting marginal cost pricing of products and avoiding the trap of overly bureaucratic and centralized decision-making. By decoupling the rewards for successful R&D investment from the sales of products, the new model will permit governments to create more efficient and useful incentives for R&D that focus on inventions that improve health outcomes.
Prize mechanisms can be implemented in ways that are consistent with a robust patent system, but are best implemented in systems where the patent system is used to establish ownership of inventions and thus claims on the prize rewards, rather than through exclusive rights to market products. It is important that those incentives are linked to broad research priorities, and not be overly prescriptive in terms of diseases, mechanisms or technologies. By eliminating marketing monopolies on products, there is an opportunity for much greater efficiency through unrestricted competition to manufacture the resulting medical products.

The elimination of marketing monopolies, the de-coupling of R&D incentives from prices, and the creation of an evidence-based reward system linked to changes in health outcomes will lead to significant reductions in expenditures to market products, the area of the largest waste in the current system.

It is important that the total obligations to finance the reward payment are not directly tied to utilization, but rather measures of a country’s ability to contribute to global R&D costs, so that countries do not have incentives to limit access to products in order to control budget outlays on innovation rewards.

Prize mechanisms can be introduced in areas where the markets are functioning the poorest, such as for diseases that primarily affect poor people living in poor countries. But the largest benefit will come from the adoption of prize mechanisms in higher-income markets, such as the United States, both because improvements in the efficiency of R&D incentives in high-income countries are important for the development of medicines used everywhere, and also because pricing norms in high-income countries are forcefully exported to developing countries, creating enormous hardships.

Whilst additional detailed modeling will be required to improve reward structures and evaluation criteria, these efforts are feasible and not materially different from efforts by governments or insurance companies to determine acceptable reimbursements for insured products.

A significant shift to a new system of incentives that relies upon prizes rather than prices will also require a shift to a new global trade framework that focuses less on intellectual property rights and more on country contributions to mechanisms that support R&D, including but not limited to prize incentive mechanisms.

The major challenge to switching financing systems for medical innovation on a global scale depends on whether there is sufficient political leadership.