

THE COLOR OF BRAZIL: LAW, ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

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INTRODUCTION

It is widely accepted in economics literature that ethnically contested societies are prone to political instability, which in turn is an established impediment to economic growth and development.¹ Many developing countries have begun to recognize the importance of a properly functioning legal framework for economic development. Legal responses to ethnic discrimination or other forms of social differentiation come mostly in the form of antidiscrimination laws. As many developing countries invest in stronger legal frameworks, antidiscrimination laws have become a pervasive tool in efforts to mitigate socioeconomic inequalities in the labor market and in society in general.

Antidiscrimination laws are designed to correct labor market distortions on the basis of somewhat settled distinctions such as race, gender, age, and sexual orientation.² However, in many developing countries where the basis of discrimination is primarily based on ethnic orientation, understanding its various manifestations is critical to proposing laws that can effectively ameliorate ethnic bias in society and promote economic growth and development. Most empirical studies that have examined the link be-

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1. See Anthony Annett, *Social Fractionalization, Political Instability, and the Size of Government*, 48 IMF STAFF PAPERS 561 (2001); Robert J. Barro, *Determinants of Democracy*, 107 J. POL. ECON. S158, S158–60 (1999); Paul Collier, *Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance*, 12 ECON. & POL. 225 (2000); William Easterly & Ross Levine, *Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions*, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1203 (1997); Paolo Mauro, *Corruption and Growth*, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 683 (1995).

2. For more, see William J. Collins, *The Labor Market Impact of State-Level Anti-Discrimination Laws, 1940-1960*, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 244, 244–45 (2003); John J. Donohue, *Antidiscrimination Law*, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).

tween ethnicity and growth have relied on the Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF).³ I have discussed elsewhere the limits of ELF, primarily its undue reliance on language as a measure of ethnic fractionalization.⁴ I proposed a more robust measure, called the Social Diversity Index (SDI) that more fully captures the complexity of ethnicity.⁵ In this article, I examine the application of SDI in a legal context where antidiscrimination laws have been enacted to ameliorate the destabilizing effects of fractionalization. Using Brazil as a case study, I suggest ways in which legal remedies may be more effectively designed to contain effects of heterogeneity, especially its impact on economic growth potential.

There are a number of reasons for choosing Brazil in this study. Besides having the largest economy and being the most populous country in Latin America, Brazil has a unique history of cultural and racial migration, which has created a racially diverse society. Despite this racial diversity, marked inequalities continue to prevail along racial lines, especially in education, as well as in the labor market and other sectors of the economy.

3. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index was constructed by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson in 1972, based on the data contained in SOLOMON BRUK, V. ALENCENKO & VLADIMIR G. TELBERG, *ATLAS NARODOV MIRA* (1964). CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR & MICHAEL C. HUDSON, *WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS* (2d ed. 1972). This data was compiled by Soviet social scientists in 1960 in an attempt to determine the number of ethno-linguistic groups in the world population on a per country basis. The ELF Index is defined as:

$$ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^I \left(\frac{n_i}{N} \right)^2, \quad i = 1, \dots, I$$

where n_i is the number of people in the i th group, N is the population, and I is the number of ethno-linguistic groups in the country. ELF measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. The values range from 0 to 1, 0 representing no fractionalization (or perfect homogeneity), and 1 representing the highest level of heterogeneity. For more on the ELF values, see Appendix A, *infra*, at 195.

4. For an extensive critique of ELF and a discussion of the inherent bias of using language as a main determinant of ethnic diversity, see Tade O. Okediji, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Fragmentation: A Proposal for an Expanded Measurement Index*, 64 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 637, 652, 655 (2005).

5. The SDI is a weighted index of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation. It is defined as:

$$SDI = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^S \sum_{j=1}^R \sum_{k=1}^L \left(\frac{n_{ijk}}{N} \right)^2, \quad i = 1, \dots, S, \quad j = 1, \dots, R, \quad \text{and} \quad k = 1, \dots, L,$$

where n represents the number of people in the i th and j th and k th groups, N is the population, and L , R , and S are, respectively, the number of linguistic, racial and religious groups in the country. The primary source of data for the SDI is 2 DAVID B. BARRETT, GERORGE T. KURIAN & TODD M. JOHNSON, *WORLD CHRISTIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA* (2d ed. 2001). Secondary sources include U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, *THE WORLD FACTBOOK* (1999) and CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR & MICHAEL C. HUDSON, *WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS* (2d ed. 1972). The SDI represents the first attempt to capture the multiple and overlapping features of ethnic expression in a single index, and in effect, to offer a measure of social fragmentation. The SDI was computed for 132 countries. For more, see Appendix B, *infra*, at 197.

Brazil has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world.⁶ This complex relationship between social identity and the economic performance of Brazil continues to generate research initiatives and is the focus of this paper.

In Part I of this paper, I discuss race, color and economic growth in Brazil. In Part II, I examine policy considerations for legal responses to ethnic fragmentation in Brazil, and in Part III, I offer my conclusions.

I. RACE, COLOR, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL

No other country in Latin America presents a more complex relationship between race/color and economic development than Brazil, which has attracted the attention of many scholars due to its unique history of cultural and racial migration to the country. Centuries of miscegenation among the races has created a society in which racial distinctions are made on the basis of color and not race, essentially blurring racial boundaries. According to Brazilian census figures, 54% of the population is white, 40% brown, 5.4% black, and 0.6% native Indians and Asians.⁷ However, if one classifies “black” as people of African descent, then roughly 45% of the population is black. As stated earlier, Brazil has one of the highest income inequality and poverty rates in the world and its poverty rates are highly correlated with race/color.⁸ Measuring diversity in Brazil on the basis of its ELF value of 0.06 would suggest that the country is ethnically homogeneous.⁹ Indeed, such a low ELF value could reinforce the myth of a racial democracy and conceal the marked socioeconomic inequalities among population groups and regions. More importantly, if language is employed as the sole basis for ethnic differentiation, public policy responses to address these problems would be ineffective. However, neither the socioeco-

6. For a presentation of the Gini coefficient—a measure of income inequality—for Brazil based on individuals employed ten years and more by region from 1989–1999, see Tade O. Okediji, *The Dynamics of Race, Ethnicity and Economic Development: The Brazilian Experience*, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 201, 212 tbl.8 (2004).

7. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA [IBGE], PEQUISA NACIONAL POR AMOSTRA DE DOMICÍLIOS 2001 [National Household Survey for 2001] tbl.1.2b (2001) (Braz.) available at <http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2001/sintese2001.pdf>.

8. This conclusion is well established in economics literature. For a recent discussion, see Carlos Gradín, *Why Is Poverty So High Among Afro-Brazilians? A Decomposition Analysis of the Racial Poverty Gap* 16–17 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 2809, 2007), available at <http://ftp.iza.org/dp2809.pdf>.

9. The relationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth has only gained much scholarly attention in the last decade or so. Since then, a number of studies have questioned the validity of ELF as a robust measure of ethnic fragmentation. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, *Fractionalization*, 8 J. ECON. GROWTH 155, 158–59 (2003); Collier, *supra* note 1; Easterly & Levine, *supra* note 1; Daniel N. Posner, *Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa*, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 849, 850–51 (2004).

conomic discrepancies among race/color groups, nor the uneven patterns of economic growth of the regions in the country support the notion of a racial democracy. Additionally, this exposes the inherent bias of ELF, that is, the sole reliance on language as the basis for ethnic differentiation. Therefore, ELF would be heavily biased against countries in which language is the basis for ethnic differentiation. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, an endemic feature of ethnic differentiation is language, which would yield high ELF values; in South and Central America, ethnic differentiation manifests along racial lines and not language, thus yielding low ELF values. Thus, an ELF value would provide an inaccurate depiction of ethnic fragmentation. The SDI, on the other hand, provides a better measure of the nature of fragmentation in Brazil. It provides more insight into the “character” of diversity and will be valuable for proscribing appropriate policy responses to ameliorate these inequalities. The SDI value for Brazil is 0.6571.

There are two macro-dimensions of inequality that SDI exposes in Brazil. First, it exposes the inequality in the pattern of economic growth among the regions of the country. Second, it exposes the striking socioeconomic inequalities among race/color groups that continue to prevail in Brazilian society. Although I will discuss them separately, both dimensions of inequality are related, as will be demonstrated in the subsequent discussion. With respect to the unequal patterns of economic growth among the regions, this can be traced to the geography of ethnic/racial and cultural migration of the groups to Brazil, which ultimately influenced the level of industrialization and urbanization.¹⁰ Specifically, post-sixteenth century, European migration to Brazil (by Germans, Italians, and Poles) was to the South, due to large deposits of gold and diamonds in places like Minas Gerais and Matto Grosso, as well as the presence of rich agricultural and pastoral land.¹¹ Japanese migration was to the South and Southeast, mainly to São Paulo. African migration via the trans-Atlantic slave trade was directed to the rubber plantations in the Northeast, and the indigenous peoples resided in the Amazon. Subsequently, the South and Southeast became thriving agricultural and industrial centers, while the North and the Northeast lagged in economic growth. In spite of centuries of miscegenation, this pattern of migration has left a lasting racial imprint on Brazilian society

10. See E. BRADFORD BURNS, *A HISTORY OF BRAZIL* 3–7 (3d ed. 1993); CARLOS ALFREDO HASENBALG, *DISCRIMINAÇÃO E DESIGUALDADES RACIAIS NO BRASIL [DISCRIMINATION AND INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL]* (Patrick Burglin trans., 1979); THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, *BRAZIL: FIVE CENTURIES OF CHANGE* 19–25 (1999); THOMAS SOWELL, *MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD VIEW* 82–90, 156–59 (1996).

11. BURNS, *supra* note 10, at 5, 48; SOWELL, *supra* note 10.

(see Tables 1 and 2). For instance, a majority of the white population resides in the South and the Southeast, while a majority of the black population resides in the North and Northeast. The brown or mulatto population also resides in the North and the Northeast. The Southwest region is considered a transition zone that integrates the African North and the European South, and is also the industrial heartland of Brazil.

The second dimension of inequality exposed by the SDI among race/color groups is more insidious. Levels of per capita income and levels of poverty in Brazil are highly correlated with race/color groups, in which Afro-Brazilians are twice as poor as whites, and are in fact at the bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid at all levels (education, residential status, access to healthcare, and public and private sector employment).¹² The discrepancies in income and labor market bias can be traced to education. As discussed earlier, the South and the Southeast are the most developed regions in Brazil. The federal universities, which are the most prestigious institutions of higher education in Brazil, and in which entry is very competitive, are disproportionately located in these regions.¹³ Furthermore, nonwhites are a minority in these regions, and their rate of entrance into these institutions is quite low. A number of reasons account for this. One such reason is that most of the public primary/elementary and secondary schools in Brazil are weak, and students who graduate from public secondary schools are inadequately prepared to successfully pursue a university education. A disproportionate number of children from poorer households (mostly nonwhites) attend these schools, while children from more affluent households attend private primary and secondary schools, which gives them a better opportunity to successfully pursue a university education. Consequently, students from the highest socioeconomic background (mostly whites) are able to attend the federal universities.¹⁴ Private universities, although not as competitive as federal universities, are quite expensive, which again constrains the ability of nonwhites to attend, since they are unable to afford the private universities due to low income levels.

These disparities in education have been attributed to the unequal distribution of income that continues to prevail in Brazil. Earnings potential is highly correlated with educational attainment, and as long as the labor market discriminates on the basis of educational attainment, it ultimately creates a racial bias in the labor market. For as long as access to education is

12. See Gradín, *supra* note 8, at 4.

13. See Edward E. Telles, *Industrialization and Racial Inequality in Employment: The Brazilian Example*, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 46, 49 (1994).

14. See Jean-Jacques Paul & Laurence Wolff, *The Economics of Higher Education*, in OPPORTUNITY FOREGONE: EDUCATION IN BRAZIL 523 (Nancy Birdsall & Richard H. Sabot eds., 1996).

limited, educational inequalities will persist and continue to reinforce the income gap between whites and nonwhites. Thus, the education variable captures the insidious nature of racism in Brazil. As a social variable, racial status reveals that being nonwhite implies lower earnings potential as compared to whites in all employment or income categories.¹⁵ It has been suggested that industrialization may have reinforced the income inequality via socioeconomic variables such as education, location of industries and occupational structure.¹⁶ Although Brazil has not experienced “incessant” racial conflict when compared to other fragmented multiethnic societies, it does not necessarily imply that the society is not susceptible to ethnic or social tensions, especially if there are no policy initiatives to ameliorate these problems. In fact, in recent years crime rates have increased significantly due to high incidence of poverty and social exclusion.¹⁷

15. See Edward E. Telles, *Urban Labor Market Segmentation and Income in Brazil*, 41 *ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE* 231, 240 (1993); Okediji, *supra* note 6.

16. See Herbert Blumer, *Industrialisation and Race Relations*, in *INDUSTRIALISATION AND RACE RELATIONS* 220–21, 239–50 (Guy Hunter ed., Greenwood Press 1985) (1965).

17. *Urban Crime and Violence: Combating Citizens' Sense of Insecurity*, THINKING BRAZIL NO. 21 (Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars, Washington, D.C.), May 2006, at 4–5, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ThinkingBrazil_21.pdf.

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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION BY COLOR/RACIAL GROUPS, BY REGION IN BRAZIL, 1999¹⁸

Region	Color group				Total
	White (%)	Brown (%)	Black (%)	Native Indians and Asians (%)	
North	28.4	68.3	2.3	1.03	100.3
Northeast	29.7	64.5	5.6	0.16	99.9
Southeast	64.0	28.4	6.7	0.82	99.9
South	83.6	12.6	3.0	0.70	99.9
Center-West	46.2	49.4	3.5	0.83	100.0
Total	54.0	39.5	5.7	0.8	100.0

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF COLOR/RACIAL GROUPS, BY REGION IN BRAZIL, 1999¹⁹

Region	Color group			
	White (%)	Brown (%)	Black (%)	Native Indians and Asians (%)
North	1.38	3.33	0.114	0.05
Northeast	8.60	18.60	1.63	0.048
Southeast	28.00	12.41	2.94	0.361
South	12.78	1.93	0.464	0.107
Center-West	3.24	3.48	0.250	0.0509
Total	54.00	39.75	5.39	0.625

18. IGBE, *supra* note 7.

19. *Id.*

II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGAL RESPONSES TO FRAGMENTATION IN BRAZIL

Despite the significant marked socioeconomic inequalities among race/color groups, it was not until the 1990s that the government of Brazil began to admit that racial discrimination did indeed exist in the country. This became a focal point in the public discourse on race, which followed on the heels of the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa in 2001. The legal tradition with respect to race in Brazil is quite unique. Slavery was abolished in 1888, roughly 300 years after the country was colonized by the Portuguese. Subsequent to this, laws pertaining to race were based on constitutional provisions of 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967, 1969, and 1988 that explicitly guaranteed equal protection of all citizens regardless of race, color, sex, and age, and mandated that racial prejudice be punished by law.²⁰ Unlike the United States, which instituted race-based laws that legally mandated segregation and favored discrimination, Brazil did not have the same legal precedent. Thus, legal remedies designed to mobilize against such domination were unwarranted.²¹ In fact, as already stated, miscegenation was promoted in an attempt to alter the racial composition of Brazil and “whiten” the country, especially since the Portuguese imported more Africans than the number of Indians they found in the colony.²²

However, extreme socioeconomic inequalities on the basis of race/color have forced Brazil to confront the issue of race and propose remedies to correct the discrepancies.²³ To date, the most controversial policy designed to reduce racial inequality has been the national affirmative action legislation based on hiring quotas for blacks, women, and handicapped people, instituted in September of 2001.²⁴ Unsurprisingly, the af-

20. See Hédio Silva, Jr., *Do racismo legal ao princípio da ação afirmativa: a lei como obstáculo e como instrumento dos direitos e interesses do povo negro* [From Racism to the Legal Principle of Affirmative Action: The Law as a Barrier and as a Tool for the Rights and Interests of Black People], in TRIANDO A MÁSCARA: ENSAIOS SOBRE O RACISMO NO BRASIL 359 (Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães & Lynn Huntley eds., 2000).

21. See ANTHONY W. MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION: A COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRAZIL 22–25 (1998).

22. BURNS, *supra* note 10, at 3–4.

23. See HASENBALG, *supra* note 10; DESIGUALDADE RACIAL NO BRASIL CONTEMPORÂNEO [RACIAL INEQUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL] (Peggy A. Lovell ed., 1991); NELSON DO VALLE SILVA & CARLOS A. HASENBALG, RELAÇÕES RACIAIS NO BRASIL CONTEMPORÂNEO [RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL] (1992).

24. This initiative started during the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso after 1995, when through a decree he established an “Interministerial Working Group to Valorize the Black Population” (GTI) and made a public declaration recognizing the existence of racial discrimination and

firmative action legislation has been embroiled in a shroud of controversy from a number of quarters.²⁵ However, in spite of the criticisms and controversy surrounding affirmative action, it has certainly forced Brazilians to confront the issue of racism in contemporary society. This being said, the affirmative action program presents critical issues to be considered. For instance, it is a race-based legislation; however, Brazilians are more preoccupied with classifications on the basis of color rather than race. Consequently, such legislation can present significant long-term implications. For instance, it can potentially alter race consciousness in future generations from a color continuum to a bipolar classification such as “white” or “black,” and it can also alter social dynamics in future generations. Another perspective on the affirmative action program relates to higher education. As indicated earlier, one of the major causes of inequality in educational attainment between blacks and whites is income and low-quality public primary/elementary education. Rectifying this discrepancy apart from the quota system would require government policies aimed at investing in public primary/elementary education in order to improve standards and the opportunity for students to compete for entrance into public universities. Correcting the problem at the tertiary level must start at the elementary and secondary levels, especially since private primary/elementary schools are not affordable for most blacks who are disproportionately represented in the low income category.

Overall, it is an understatement that the affirmative action legislation has forced a heated debate in the public sphere on racism, racial inequality

the need to implement policies to eliminate it. *See* Mala Htun, *From “Racial Democracy” to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil*, 39 *LATIN AM. RES. REV.* 60, 67 (2004); Sergio da Silva Martins, Carlos Alberto Medeiros & Elisa Larkin Nascimento, *Paving Paradise: The Road from “Racial Democracy” to Affirmative Action in Brazil*, 34 *J. BLACK STUD.* 787, 797 (2004). In 2001, the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development announced an affirmative action program for race and ethnicity by instituting a minimum quota of 20% for blacks in jobs within the Ministry, and a quota of 30% by 2003 in firms seeking contracts from the Ministry. In similar fashion, the Ministry of Justice instituted quotas of 20% for blacks, 20% for women, and 5% for handicapped people in management levels, as well as in firms offering services to the Ministry of Justice. *See* Htun, *supra*, at 68. Subsequently, in 2002, the Foreign Ministry instituted its own affirmative action program by subsidizing the admission of twenty black students to the Rio Branco Institute in order to increase the number of blacks in the diplomatic corps. *See id.* at 69; Martins, Medeiros & Nascimento, *supra*. Finally, in 2002, President Cardoso issued a decree creating a National Affirmative Action Program at the Federal level in Brazil. Decree No. 4228, May 13, 2002, [XCI] *Diário Oficial da União* [D.O.U.] 6 (Braz.), available at http://www.trt02.gov.br/geral/tribunal2/Legis/Decreto/4228_02.html. Its goals included proposing how government agencies could institute certain percentage targets in hiring Afro-Brazilians, women, and handicapped persons. It also extended to the education system and in particular, federal and private universities, by establishing a 20% quota for blacks.

25. Issues pertaining to the legality of quotas as a means to correct racial inequality as well as reverse discrimination have been raised by several scholars. *See, e.g.*, Htun, *supra* note 24, at 73–75. The affirmative action legislation has also raised the question of who is “black” and how this racial category is determined. *See* SKIDMORE, *supra* note 10, at 208–10.

and other socioeconomic inequalities in Brazil. However, the benefit of this public debate will be to ultimately initiate policies that will address the broad socioeconomic discrepancies in Brazilian society.

CONCLUSION

One of the most crucial aspects of economic development is human development. For economic development to truly live up to its meaning in Brazil and Latin America as a whole, issues pertaining to racial equality, income inequality, and social justice must be addressed. One of the purposes of deriving the SDI was to unpack the multifarious nature of ethnic diversity and to move beyond the linguistic-based measure found in the ELF Index in an attempt to expose its inherent bias as well as its limited utility for crafting public policy. Understanding the nature of ethnic diversity is relevant for the development of appropriate and robust legal remedies and other government policies designed to redress socioeconomic inequalities based on race/color. This is especially relevant for Brazil, which has experienced such a unique racial history and in which racial boundaries, though they exist, tend to blur due to centuries of miscegenation, and which at the same time exhibits significant racial inequalities. To this end, the affirmative action legislation in Brazil represents a good first step in recognizing the existence of racial inequalities and social exclusion, and will certainly serve to promote legal and public policy mechanisms to ameliorate pervasive socioeconomic inequalities in Brazilian society. At a broader level, the Brazilian initiative may serve as a pioneering example for other Latin American countries on implementing public policies to combat racial discrimination.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A: ETHNOLINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX BY REGION AND RANK ²⁶

Region	ELF	Region	ELF
ASIA		SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	
India	.89	Zaire	.90
Indonesia	.76	Tanzania	.93
Philippines	.74	Uganda	.90
Malaysia	.72	Cameroon	.89
Nepal	.70	South Africa	.88
Thailand	.66	Nigeria	.87
Pakistan	.64	Cote d'Ivoire	.86
Burma	.47	Central African Repub.	.83
Sri Lanka	.47	Kenya	.83
Singapore	.42	Liberia	.83
Taiwan	.42	Zambia	.82
Hong Kong	.02	Angola	.78
Japan	.01	Mali	.78
South Korea	.00	Sierra-Leone	.77
LATIN AMERICA/CARRIBEAN		Guinea	.75
Bolivia	.68	Gambia	.73
Guatemala	.64	Niger	.73
Peru	.59	Sudan	.73
Guyana	.58	Senegal	.72
Trinidad/Tobago	.56	Ghana	.71
Ecuador	.53	Togo	.71
Argentina	.31	Chad	.69
Mexico	.30	Ethiopia	.69
Panama	.28	Gabon	.69
Barbados	.22	Burkina Faso	.68
Uruguay	.20	Federal Rep. of Congo	.66
Nicaragua	.18	Mozambique	.65
El Salvador	.17	Benin	.62
Honduras	.16	Malawi	.62
Chile	.14	Mauritius	.58
Paraguay	.14	Zimbabwe	.54
Venezuela	.11	Botswana	.51
Brazil	.07	Mauritania	.33
Costa Rica	.07	Lesotho	.22
Colombia	.06	Rwanda	.14
Jamaica	.05	Somalia	.08
Dominican Republic	.04	Madagascar	.06
Haiti	.01	Burundi	.04

26. TAYLOR & HUDSON, *supra* note 3, at 271 tbl.4.15.

Region	ELF	Region	ELF
WESTERN EUROPE/NORTH AMERICA		NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE-EAST	
Canada	.75	Iran	.76
Belgium	.55	Morocco	.53
Switzerland	.50	Algeria	.43
USA	.50	Iraq	.36
Spain	.44	Turkey	.25
New Zealand	.37	Syria	.22
Cyprus	.35	Israel	.20
Australia	.32	Kuwait	.18
United Kingdom	.32	Tunisia	.16
France	.26	Saudi Arabia	.06
Finland	.16	Jordan	.05
Luxembourg	.15	Egypt	.04
Austria	.13	Yemen	.02
Greece	.10		
Netherlands	.10		
Malta	.08		
Sweden	.08		
Denmark	.05		
Iceland	.05		
Norway	.04		
Ireland	.04		
Italy	.04		
Germany	.03		
Portugal	.01		

APPENDIX B

TABLE B: SOCIAL DIVERSITY INDEX BY REGION AND RANK²⁷

Region	ELF	Region	ELF
ASIA		LATIN AMERICA/CARRIBEAN cont.	
Burma	.9984	Uruguay	.6599
India	.9757	Brazil	.6571
Singapore	.9750	Chile	.6217
Indonesia	.9610	Venezuela	.5905
Fiji	.9380	Dominican Republic	.5301
Malaysia	.9364	Argentina	.4846
Philippines	.9179	Honduras	.4730
Laos	.8957	Costa Rica	.4673
Mongolia	.8936	Paraguay	.4371
China	.8832	Haiti	.4112
South Korea	.8556	El Salvador	.3326
Thailand	.8314	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	
Taiwan	.8260	Sudan	.9984
Vietnam	.8171	Tanzania	.9949
Cambodia	.8008	Cameroon	.9948
Timor	.7994	Liberia	.9943
Nepal	.7988	Central African Republic	.9935
Pakistan	.7968	Ghana	.9920
Sri Lanka	.7312	Togo	.9898
Japan	.6471	D. Republic of Congo	.9893
Bangladesh	.5185	Cote d'Ivoire	.9890
Hong Kong	.1400	Kenya	.9853
LATIN AMERICA/CARRIBEAN		Zambia	.9847
Suriname	.9718	Uganda	.9819
Trinidad/Tobago	.9436	Chad	.9810
Guyana	.9217	Federal Republic of Congo	.9804
Jamaica	.8462	Mozambique	.9787
Cuba	.8352	Madagascar	.9760
Bahamas	.8334	Nigeria	.9738
Peru	.8121	Zimbabwe	.9720
Bolivia	.8117	Malawi	.9717
Barbados	.8080	Botswana	.9715
Panama	.7845	South Africa	.9711
Ecuador	.7487	Ethiopia	.9650
Colombia	.7033	Gabon	.9604
Mexico	.6989	Benin	.9600
Guatemala	.6961	Guinea-Bissau	.9479
Nicaragua	.6848	Mauritius	.9417

27. Okediji, *supra* note 4.

Region	ELF	Region	ELF
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA cont.		WESTERN EUROPE/NORTH AMERICA	
Sierra-Leone	.9380	Canada	.9895
Angola	.9148	USA	.9621
Mali	.9108	New Zealand	.9403
Niger	.9003	Australia	.9396
Namibia	.8753	Switzerland	.8615
Senegal	.8730	Germany	.8582
Mauritania	.8724	United Kingdom	.8541
Guinea	.8714	France	.8464
Gambia	.8550	Belgium	.7620
Lesotho	.8453	Spain	.7435
Swaziland	.8076	Italy	.6750
Djibouti	.7879	Sweden	.6253
Rwanda	.7513	Ireland	.6127
Namibia	.8753	Luxembourg	.5768
Burundi	.7475	Austria	.5558
Somalia	.4511	Norway	.5163
NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE-EAST		Netherlands	.4505
Qatar	.9943	Cyprus	.3517
Israel	.9527	Finland	.3176
Kuwait	.9007	Greece	.2999
Bahrain	.8468	Denmark	.2977
Iran	.8351	Iceland	.2807
Iraq	.8276	Portugal	.2771
Oman	.7970	Malta	.2045
Lebanon	.7941		
Morocco	.7932		
Jordan	.7840		
Turkey	.6963		
Algeria	.6450		
Yemen	.6276		
Palestine	.6061		
Syria	.5421		
Tunisia	.5200		
Egypt	.4707		
Saudi Arabia	.4457		